Broker-Dealer Use of “Idle” Customer Assets: Customer Protection With Sweep Program and Securities Lending by Tepe, George
TEPE – FINAL  
 
 
BROKER-DEALER USE OF “IDLE” 
CUSTOMER ASSETS: CUSTOMER 
PROTECTION WITH SWEEP PROGRAMS 
AND SECURITIES LENDING 
George Tepe∗ 
Equity investors, whether hedge funds or retail investors, 
must trade stocks through broker-dealers, and when these 
investors are not actively trading, their securities and 
uninvested cash remain with their broker-dealer. What 
broker-dealers do with these “idle” customer assets is a vast 
and largely unexamined business that is a key source of 
revenue for broker-dealers. This Note provides the first 
comprehensive examination of the trade-offs in regulating 
broker-dealer use of idle customer assets through case studies 
of broker-dealer sweeps of uninvested customer cash, broker-
dealer lending of customer margin securities, and the effect of 
securities lending on customers’ shareholder votes. 
On one hand, broker-dealer use of idle customer assets 
potentially increases agency costs and systemic risk by 
increasing broker-dealer interconnectedness and allowing 
broker-dealers to profit off customer assets. On the other 
hand, proper use of idle assets can generate positive outcomes 
for customers through higher returns and positive social 
benefits for the general market. This Note proposes and 
examines potential reforms like increased disclosure and 
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reporting requirements that provide better protection for 
broker-dealer customers. 
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Equity investors, whether hedge funds or retail investors, 
must trade stocks through broker-dealers, and when these 
investors are not actively trading, their securities and 
uninvested cash remain with their broker-dealer. What 
broker-dealers do with these “idle” customer assets is a vast 
and largely unexamined business that is a key source of 
revenue for broker-dealers. This Note provides the first 
comprehensive examination of the trade-offs in regulating 
broker-dealers’ use of idle customer assets. Specifically, this 
Note will discuss broker-dealer sweeps of uninvested 
customer cash, broker-dealer lending of customer margin 
securities, and the effect of securities lending on customers’ 
shareholder votes. 
Broker-dealers’ ability to profit from idle customer assets 
conflicts with the original intent of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) customer protection regulation, namely 
“forbidding brokers and dealers from using customer assets 
to finance any part of their businesses unrelated to servicing 
securities customers.”1 With sweep programs, broker-dealers 
sweep uninvested customer cash into a bank or money 
market fund, allowing the broker-dealer and the sweep 
counterparty to invest and profit from customers’ cash.2 With 
lending of customer margin securities, broker-dealers lend 
securities owned by customers in exchange for a fee paid only 
to the broker-dealer.3 Surprisingly, customers may not know 
if and when their margin securities are lent, and, even more 
surprisingly, a broker-dealer may not know which customer’s 
securities it has lent.4 With the securities lending market 
 
1 Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 50 Fed. Reg. 
2690, 2690 (Jan. 18, 1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).  
2 See infra Section II.B. 
3 See infra Section II.C. 
4 Id. 
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totaling roughly $1.9 trillion,5 such broker-dealer practices 
have large ramifications for the financial sector. In addition, 
customers whose securities have been lent by their broker-
dealer no longer have their shareholder voting rights and 
could have their proxy votes cancelled by their broker-dealer 
without their knowledge.6 How broker-dealers count 
customer shareholder votes implicates larger debates about 
the importance of shareholder voting,7 and previous authors 
have examined broker-dealer lending of customer securities 
from the perspective of corporate voting.8 However, no article 
has examined canceling shareholder votes through the lens 
of broker-dealer customer protection. 
Broker-dealer use of idle customer assets raises serious 
questions about the adequacy of current customer protection 
regulations. Although customers can share in the returns 
from their idle assets, the fact that broker-dealers and their 
affiliates retain a significant portion of the profits means 
that broker-dealer use of idle customer assets creates an 
agency problem in which broker-dealers may serve their own 
interests, rather than those of their customers.9 Moreover, 
broker-dealer use of idle customer assets increases the 
 
5 FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 56 (2015). 
6 See infra Section II.D. 
7 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1735 (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in 
Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
8 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of 
Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1258 (2008). 
9 An agency problem occurs when an agent working on behalf of a 
principal fails to maximize the welfare of the principal. The costs to the 
principal associated with the agency problem include monitoring and 
bonding expenditures used to align the incentives of the agent and 
principal, and the residual loss caused by the divergence between the 
agent’s decisions and the decisions that would maximize the welfare of the 
principal. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
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interconnectedness of broker-dealers and therefore may 
increase systemic risk. This Note argues that the SEC 
should require increased disclosures by broker-dealers to 
allow customers to know when their idle assets are used by 
their broker-dealer and to better understand the possible 
agency costs associated with broker-dealer use of their idle 
assets. Increased disclosure should also facilitate a better-
informed market solution to the agency costs associated with 
these transactions by allowing customers to potentially 
demand a larger share of the revenue created by the use of 
their assets or to opt out of these arrangements entirely. 
This Note also argues that the SEC should collect data on 
these transactions in order to better understand their 
systemic risks. Finally, this Note explores whether more 
invasive regulations like caps on fees and bans on canceling 
customer proxy votes may be necessary. 
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the current 
regulatory environment surrounding broker-dealer sweep 
programs and securities lending. Specifically, Part II reviews 
the SEC customer protection rule, Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority’s (“FINRA”) proposed rules regarding 
sweep program disclosures, Federal Reserve and FINRA 
regulations on securities lending, rules about the proxy 
voting system, and current broker-dealer disclosures and 
corporate vote reconciliation practices. Part III identifies and 
describes potential agency costs and systemic risks 
associated with broker-dealer use of idle customer assets. 
Part IV presents potential solutions to the agency costs and 
systemic risks associated with broker-dealer sweep programs 
and securities lending. Part V offers concluding remarks. 
II. BACKGROUND: CUSTOMER PROTECTION 
RULE, SWEEP PROGRAMS, SECURITIES LENDING, 
AND CUSTOMER SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
Broker-dealer customers are protected by a myriad of 
regulation dating back to the 1970s. This Part examines how 
customer assets are currently protected by presenting the 
current regulatory requirements regarding broker-dealer use 
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of customer assets. Section II.A will provide a brief 
description of the policy aims underlying the adoption of the 
SEC customer protection rule. Section II.B will explain 
broker-dealer sweep programs and associated SEC and 
FINRA regulations. Section II.C will provide an overview of 
broker-dealer lending of customer securities and associated 
Federal Reserve, SEC, and FINRA regulations. Finally, 
Section II.D will briefly describe the effects on customer 
shareholder rights when broker-dealers lend customer 
securities. 
A. Adoption of Rule 15c3-3—Policy Aims 
SEC Rule 15c3-3, otherwise known as the customer 
protection rule, is the main regulatory provision that governs 
the relationship between a broker-dealer and its customers.10 
The key components of the customer protection rule are 
segregation of customer cash and the requirement that 
broker-dealers have possession and control of customer 
securities.11 The SEC adopted Rule 15c3-3 in 1972 as part of 
the regulatory response to the paperwork crisis of the late 
1960s.12 The rule was based on an amendment to the 
 
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2015). 
11 Id. 
12 Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. 
Reg. 25,224, 25,224–25 (Nov. 29, 1972) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); 
Jerry W. Markham, Custodial Requirements for Customer Funds, 8 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 92, 100 (2013). With increasing trading 
volume in the 1960s, broker-dealers were unable to keep up with the 
physical exchange of paper stock certificates, which led to a sharp decrease 
in trading volume and stock prices. See Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. 
Werner, The History of Regulation of Clearing in the Securities and 
Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 313, 317–18 (2010). After the paperwork crisis and the ensuing failure 
and prolonged bankruptcies of many broker-dealers, Congress enacted the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 to increase the protection for 
customer assets held by a broker-dealer. See What SIPC Protects, SEC. INV. 
PROTECTION CORP., http://www.sipc.org/for-investors/what-sipc-protects 
[https://perma.cc/7VGN-69MV] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017). Based on this 
general congressional directive to increase broker-dealer customer 
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which directed the SEC to 
adopt safeguards respecting the financial responsibility of 
brokers and dealers concerning customer assets.13 Rule 15c3-
3 is designed “to give more specific protection to customer 
funds and securities, in effect forbidding brokers and dealers 
from using customer assets to finance any part of their 
businesses unrelated to servicing securities customers.”14 In 
other words, SEC regulation separates customer assets from 
broker-dealers’ proprietary trading and quickly returns 
customer assets should the broker-dealer fail.15 Moreover, 
 
protection, the SEC adopted Rule 15c3-3 in 1972. Net Capital 
Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 50 Fed. Reg. 2690, 2690 (Jan. 18, 
1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see also Reserves and Related 
Measures Respecting the Financial Responsibility of Brokers and Dealers, 
36 Fed. Reg. 22,312, 22,312 (Nov. 24, 1971) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
13 Congress and the SEC determined that customer protection 
regulations were necessary for “safeguarding the handling of customer 
property” and “to furnish the protection for the integrity of customer funds 
and securities.” Reserves and Related Measures Respecting the Financial 
Responsibility of Brokers and Dealers, 36 Fed. Reg. at 22,312; Broker-
Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. Reg. at 25,224; 
see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (2012). 
14 Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 50 Fed. Reg. at 
2690; see also Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 
Fed. Reg. at 25,224. 
15 See Customer Protection Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,896, 11,897 (Mar. 
26, 1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“Rule 15c3-3 was designed to 
assure that customers' funds (as well as securities) held by broker-dealers 
are protected against broker-dealer misuse or insolvency.”); Amendments 
to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,862, 
12,862 (Mar. 19, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“The intent of 
the [customer protection] rule is to require a broker-dealer to hold 
customer assets in a manner that enables their prompt return in the event 
of an insolvency, which, in turn, increases the ability of the firm to wind 
down in an orderly self-liquidation and, thereby avoid the need for a 
proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (‘SIPA’).”); 
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, A Small 
Entity Compliance Guide, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/bd-
financial-resp-secg.htm#P9_41 [https://perma.cc/EV4E-A4NU] (last 
modified Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter A Small Entity Compliance Guide] 
(“Rule 15c3-3 essentially requires a broker-dealer that maintains custody 
of customer securities and cash to segregate such securities and cash from 
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the first goal stated by the SEC in the 15c3-3 adopting 
release was: 
To insure that customers’ funds held by a broker-
dealer . . . and the cash which is realized through the 
lending, hypothecation and other permissible uses of 
customers’ securities are deployed in safe areas of the 
broker-dealer’s business related to servicing his 
customers, or to the extent that the funds are not 
deployed in these limited areas, that they be 
deposited in a reserve bank account.16 
Put simply, either broker-dealers should use the profits 
from idle customer assets, for instance through the lending 
of customer securities, to cover the cost of servicing the 
customer, or broker-dealers should return that money to 
their customers. 
B. “Idle” Customer Cash—Sweep Programs 
The main protection for customer cash held by broker-
dealers is SEC Rule 15c3-3(e), which requires that broker-
dealers place all customer cash in a separate bank account 
titled the “Special Reserve Bank Account for the Exclusive 
Benefit of Customers” (“Special Reserve Account”).17 To 
further reduce the risk to this customer cash, the SEC limits 
the investment of funds in the Special Reserve Account to 
treasuries.18 By segregating customer cash into these Special 
Reserve Accounts and limiting the investment of this cash, 
the rule bars broker-dealers from using customer cash to 
finance their proprietary business, and the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) or a bankruptcy 
 
the broker-dealer’s proprietary activities. By segregating customer 
securities and cash from a firm’s proprietary business activities, the rule 
increases the likelihood that customer assets will be readily available to be 
returned to customers if a broker-dealer fails.”). 
16 Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. 
Reg. at 25,224. 
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e) (2015). 
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(6) (2015) 
(definition of “qualified security”). 
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court can quickly return customer cash in the case of a 
broker-dealer failure.19 
Broker-dealers can circumvent the requirement to place 
customer funds into a Special Reserve Account by sweeping 
customer cash off their books and depositing the funds into 
either a bank or a money market fund.20 Rule 15c3-3(e) no 
longer applies because the broker-dealer no longer holds the 
cash on its books.21 Rather than holding customer funds in 
 
19 The Special Reserve Account was designed “in the nature of a trust 
fund” and “to protect the integrity of customer-generated funds by 
insulating them against inroads from the broker-dealer’s firm activities, 
whether they be underwriting, market making, other trading, investing or 
mere speculation in securities, meeting overhead or of any other nature 
whatever.” Reserves and Related Measures Respecting the Financial 
Responsibility of Brokers and Dealers, 36 Fed. Reg. 22,312, 22,312 (Nov. 
24, 1971) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). See also Customer Protection 
Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. at 11,897 (“Rule 15c3-3 was designed to assure that 
customers’ funds (as well as securities) held by broker-dealers are 
protected against broker-dealer misuse or insolvency.”); Amendments to 
Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, 72 Fed. Reg. at 12,862 
(“The intent of the [customer protection] rule is to require a broker-dealer 
to hold customer assets in a manner that enables their prompt return in 
the event of an insolvency, which, in turn, increases the ability of the firm 
to wind down in an orderly self-liquidation and, thereby avoid the need for 
a proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 
(‘SIPA’).”); A Small Entity Compliance Guide, supra note 15 (“Rule 15c3-3 
essentially requires a broker-dealer that maintains custody of customer 
securities and cash to segregate such securities and cash from the broker-
dealer’s proprietary activities. By segregating customer securities and 
cash from a firm’s proprietary business activities, the rule increases the 
likelihood that customer assets will be readily available to be returned to 
customers if a broker-dealer fails.”); see also Net Capital Requirements for 
Brokers and Dealers, 50 Fed. Reg. at 2690; Broker-Dealers; Maintenance 
of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. Reg. at 25,225–26. 
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(17) (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j)(2)(ii) 
(2015). 
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j)(2)(ii) (allowing transfer of free credit 
balances into a product in a sweep program); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(1) 
(2015) (referencing Exhibit A as the computation of the amount required 
to be deposited into a Special Reserve Account); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a) 
(requiring counting as a credit free credit balances in the customers’ 
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cash or treasuries, these sweep programs allow counterparty 
banks and money market funds to invest customer cash in 
riskier assets for a higher return, and broker-dealers share 
in these profits by collecting fees from sweep 
counterparties.22 
The widespread use of broker-dealer sweep programs led 
the SEC to adopt customer protection requirements in 
2013.23 Rule 15c3-3 now requires that broker-dealers get 
affirmative consent from a customer before sweeping their 
cash.24 Prior to receiving affirmative consent, broker-dealers 
must make several disclosures to customers. Specifically, 
broker-dealers must relay the general terms and conditions 
of the products available through the sweep program as well 
as the fact that the broker-dealer maintains the option to 
change the products available.25 In exchange for sweeping 
their cash, customers receive a few basis points of return26 
 
security accounts and no longer treating swept funds as free credit 
balances in the customers’ security account). 
22 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(e)(1); see SEC Office of Investor Education 
and Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Bank Sweep Programs, INVESTOR.GOV 
(June 5, 2014), http://investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-bulletins/investor-
bulletin-bank-sweep-programs [https://perma.cc/8WS8-K446] [hereinafter 
SEC, Investor Bulletin] (“Most broker-dealers keep a portion of the interest 
paid by the bank(s) as a fee for providing bank sweep services.”). 
23 Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, 78 Fed. Reg. 
51,824, 51,839–42 (Aug. 21, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j)(2)(ii)(A); Financial Responsibility Rules 
for Broker-Dealers, 78 Fed. Reg. at 51,839–42. The SEC gave temporary 
relief from enforcement of this requirement as long as a customer 
specifically consented to sweeping their cash and the broker-dealer 
received affirmative written consent within ninety days. Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2014 WL 767976 (Feb. 26, 2014). This temporary relief was 
originally granted from March 3, 2014 through March 3, 2015. Id. This 
temporary relief was subsequently extended until September 30, 2015. 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 496395 (Feb. 5, 2015). 
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j)(2)(ii)(A). 
26 For example, on January 27, 2017, the annual percentage yield 
paid by Fidelity on funds swept into a bank was 0.07%, and the 7-day yield 
on funds swept into a government money market fund was 0.19%. Interest 
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and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
protection for funds swept into a bank.27 Additionally, these 
sweeps can be returned to the broker-dealer on demand by 
customers subject to any restrictions on withdrawal by the 
bank or money market fund.28 Upon sweeping customer 
funds, the broker-dealer must make quarterly disclosures 
regarding the balance in the bank deposit account or the 
amount of shares held in the money market fund and must 
state that the customer can liquidate the balance or shares 
on demand.29 In short, current SEC rules regarding sweep 
programs protect customers by ensuring that they are 
 
Rate for the Fidelity Cash Management Account, FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, 
fidelity.com/FCMACoreRates [https://perma.cc/SS4M-DVE9] (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2017).  
27 See SEC, Investor Bulletin, supra note 22 (“Cash swept into deposit 
accounts through bank sweep programs is covered by FDIC insurance up 
to the $250,000 limit per customer at each FDIC-Insured bank that 
participates in the bank sweep program.”). 
28 Withdrawals could be barred after a failure of the bank money 
market fund. In addition, based on the recent SEC money market fund 
reform, money market funds can bar redemptions or place a fee on 
redemptions in times of stress. See Frequently Asked Questions Concerning 
the Amendments to Certain Broker-Dealer Financial Responsibility Rules 
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/amendments-to-broker-
dealer-financial-responsibility-rule-faq.htm [https://perma.cc/359L-MJUT] 
(last modified Mar. 6, 2014)  [hereinafter SEC FAQ Concerning 
Amendments]. (“A broker-dealer that sweeps a customer’s free credit 
balances to a money market mutual fund must instruct the fund to redeem 
the customer’s investment when ordered to do so by the customer and, 
when the broker-dealer receives the proceeds, return them to the 
customer’s account or remit them to the customer. The redemption itself, 
however, is subject to the terms and conditions of the money market 
mutual fund and to applicable law and regulation.”); Money Market Fund 
Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,736 (Aug. 14, 
2014). (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239). 
29 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j)(2)(ii)(B) (2015). In addition, the broker-
dealer must give thirty days notice before changing the terms and 
conditions of the sweep program, changing the terms and conditions of 
products currently available through the sweep program, changing the 
products available through the sweep program, or changing the customer’s 
investment through the sweep program. See SEC FAQ Concerning 
Amendments, supra note 28. 
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informed about the sweep program before their funds are 
swept. 
Although FINRA has not finalized its rules regarding 
broker-dealer sweep programs, in June of 2015 it announced 
proposed rule changes that would supplement the current 
requirements for broker-dealers.30 As proposed, all future 
letters to customers regarding transferring customer funds 
into a sweep program or between products in a sweep 
program would have to include the current interest rates 
applicable to the sweep program, the manner by which 
future interest rates will be determined, and the nature as 
well as the extent of SPIC and FDIC insurance available.31 
Moreover, these letters would be required to state the entity 
that the customer should contact should the customer wish 
to gain access to his or her funds and any conflicts of interest 
relating to the sweep program, including whether the broker-
dealer receives compensation or other benefits for customer 
balances held at a bank or money market fund.32 A broker-
dealer would also have to post on its website the applicable 
bank and money market fund interest rates and information 
regarding any conflicts of interest relating to its sweep 
 
30 See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-22, DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNTS 
AND TRANSACTIONS (2015), 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory_Noti
ce_15-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ASK-Z8F3]. 
31 Id. at 30–31 (see Proposed FINRA Rule 3260(c)(1)(E)(iv)).  
32 Id. In addition, in the letters required when a broker-dealer 
changes terms or products of their sweep program, broker-dealers would 
be required to describe the options available to the customer if the 
customer does not accept the new terms or products. Id. at 30 (see 
Proposed FINRA Rule 3260(c)(1)(E)(i)). In letters to customers regarding 
the transfer of the customer’s beneficial interest from one money market 
fund to another money market fund, the broker-dealer must include a 
tabular comparison of the nature and amount of the fees charged by each 
money market fund, a comparative description of the investment 
objectives of the fund and a prospectus of the money market fund to be 
purchased. Id. The proposed FINRA rule also requires that broker-dealers 
maintain detailed individual customer balances on their books and records 
for customer balances swept into a bank on an omnibus basis. Id. at 31 
(see Proposed FINRA Rule 3260(c)(1)(E)(vi)). 
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program.33 These proposed rules would strengthen the 
existing SEC customer protection requirements by requiring 
that the customers know the most important terms of the 
sweep products, namely the interest rate and the sweep 
counterparty.34 However, the proposed FINRA rules would 
not require the broker-dealer to disclose a compensation 
figure that is segmented by each sweep product or 
counterparty.35 One criticism is that merely providing the 
customer with a consolidated compensation figure is 
insufficient to enable the customer to understand the full 
conflict of interest of a broker-dealer because the customer 
cannot determine what products were most lucrative for the 
broker-dealer. 
Customer protection with sweep programs is incredibly 
important because broker-dealers often present these 
programs to customers as the default option for managing 
uninvested cash.36 Although these sweep programs have 
grown in size and importance over the past decade, the size 
of the broker-dealer sweep market is unknown because the 
SEC does not require broker-dealers to report the size of 
their sweep programs, the counterparties involved in their 
sweep programs or the amount of funds swept to each 
counterparty.37 However, based on the history of broker-
dealer sweep programs, broker-dealers likely sweep 
hundreds of billions of dollars of customer funds into 
affiliated banks and money market funds.38 
 
33 Id. (see Proposed Rule 3260(c)(1)(E)(v)). 
34 See id. 
35 Id. at 30–31 (see Proposed Rule 3260(c)(1)(E)(iv)). 
36 See SEC, Investor Bulletin, supra note 22 (“Many bank sweep 
programs are the ‘default’ option for managing cash in a brokerage 
account . . . .”). 
37 See SEC Form X-17A-5 Part I (2015); SEC Form X-17A-5 Part II 
(2015); SEC Form X-17A-5 Part IIA (2015); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 
(2015) (describing the reporting requirements for broker-dealers). 
38 In 2000, Merrill Lynch was one of the first broker-dealers to offer a 
sweep program that would sweep excess customer funds into an affiliated 
bank. See Paul T. Clark, Just Passing Through: A History and Critical 
Analysis of FDIC Insurance of Deposits Held by Brokers and Other 
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C. “Idle” Customer Securities—Securities Lending 
In addition to regulations that protect customer cash, 
regulatory rules also protect customer securities by limiting 
which of the customer’s securities broker-dealers can lend 
and under what circumstances broker-dealers can lend those 
securities. Generally, securities lending is a practice whereby 
ownership of a security is given to another for a set duration 
or until demanded back by the lender in return for a fee 
given to the lender.39 All rights associated with a lent stock, 
like the right to vote or receive a dividend, pass to the 
borrower of the stock, although borrowers are often 
contractually obligated to return the economic benefits to the 
lender.40 
Broker-dealers are allowed to lend certain customer 
securities in part because securities lending is key to many 
market functions. For example, borrowing securities is 
necessary for short selling because it allows a financial 
 
Custodians, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 99, 103 (2012). Within two years of 
beginning its bank sweep program, deposits in just one of Merrill Lynch’s 
two affiliate banks rose from $3.6 billion to over $55 billion, and within six 
years, Merrill Lynch’s banks held $80 billion in deposits. Id. at 103, 153; 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1591 (2007). Within a few years of 
Merrill Lynch introducing its bank sweep program, Lehman Brothers, 
Smith Barney, Charles Schwab, UBS, E*Trade, and Morgan Stanley 
introduced similar bank sweep programs. Clark, supra, at 153–54. Due to 
a rise in the use of sweep programs in the early 2000s, a 2004 study 
estimated that $350 billion was now in FDIC-insured deposits that would 
have otherwise been held by broker-dealers in retail money market funds. 
George Pennacchi, Deposit Insurance, Bank Regulation, and Financial 
System Risks, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 1, 15 (2006) (citing 2004 study by 
Crane and Krasner). 
39 See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: 
The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1683, 1719 (2011); see also ASS’N OF BRITISH INSURERS ET AL., 
SECURITIES LENDING: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 2 (2010), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/gilts/sl_intro_green_
9_10.pdf [https://perma.cc/CU83-KRKV]. 
40 See Omarova, supra note 39, at 1719; see also ASS’N OF BRITISH 
INSURERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 2. 
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entity to borrow a security in order to sell it in the market.41 
Short selling provides an opportunity for investors to profit 
off of a decline in the price of a security, whether for hedging 
or speculative purposes.42 In addition, securities lending is 
closely tied to the market for securities repurchase 
agreements (“repos”), which serve as the main source of 
short-term financing for broker-dealers.43 With repos, one 
party sells securities to another party for cash and agrees to 
repurchase the same securities at a future date (usually the 
following day) for a slightly higher price.44 Repos are a key 
 
41 See Division of Market Regulation: Reponses to Frequently Asked 
Questions Concerning Regulation SHO, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9BJG-73DH] (last updated Oct. 15, 2015) [hereinafter 
SEC Responses to FAQ Concerning Reg SHO] (“A short sale is the sale of a 
security that the seller does not own and any sale that is consummated by 
the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller. In 
order to deliver the security to the purchaser, the short seller will borrow 
the security, usually from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor.”). If 
a financial entity wants to sell a stock short and does not own the stock 
currently, the entity must borrow the stock to sell it now. Later, the 
financial entity would repurchase the stock in the market and return the 
stock to the lender. If the stock price has decreased in the interim, the 
short seller can repurchase the stock at a lower price and can pocket the 
profits. SEC Regulation SHO generally prohibits “naked” short selling in 
which investors sell a stock short without borrowing the security to make 
delivery. See id. (“A ‘naked’ short sale generally refers to selling short 
without having borrowed the securities to make delivery.”); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 242.203(b) (2015). 
42 SEC Responses to FAQ Concerning Reg SHO, supra note 41 (“In 
general, short selling is used to profit from an expected downward price 
movement, to provide liquidity in response to unanticipated demand, or to 
hedge the risk of an economic long position in the same security or in a 
related security.”). Short selling is often a key part of trading strategies 
and a derivatives business. For example, Bank of America and Wachovia 
Bank in the mid-2000s borrowed securities from affiliated broker-dealers 
in order to facilitate the banks’ derivatives trading business. See Omarova, 
supra note 39, at 1722–23. 
43 See Omarova, supra note 39, at 1720. 
44 See id. at n.151. Repos allow the seller of securities to, in effect, 
borrow cash from the purchaser of the securities, and the purchaser of the 
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source of short-term financing for broker-dealers because the 
parties typically roll over the one-day repos to craft longer-
term loans.45 
One rule that limits the risk to customers when a broker-
dealer lends their securities is Regulation T (“Reg T”). Reg T 
limits when broker-dealers may borrow or lend securities, 
whether customer securities or securities owned by the 
broker-dealer.46 Reg T states, “[A broker or dealer] may 
borrow or lend securities for the purpose of making delivery 
of the securities in the case of short sales, failure to receive 
securities required to be delivered, or other similar 
situations.”47 In other words, Reg T requires that the 
borrowing of equity securities be related to a delivery of 
 
securities, in effect, extends a loan collateralized with the purchased 
securities. Id. 
45 See Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk 
Loans in the New Credit Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 458 (2009). 
46 The Reg T purpose test only applies to borrowing and lending of 
equity securities. Non-equity securities are only subject to good faith loan 
value requirements under Reg T and margin requirements adopted by 
self-regulatory organizations. See Securities Credit Transactions; 
Borrowing by Brokers and Dealers, 63 Fed. Reg. 2806, 2810–12 (Jan. 16, 
1998) (“With the adoption of the good faith account, Regulation T 
restrictions on the borrowing and lending of securities will only apply to 
those securities not entitled to good faith loan value. . . . the Board 
proposed to grant good faith loan value to all non-equity securities. . . . The 
Board is amending Regulation T as proposed to permit broker-dealers to 
extend good faith credit against all non-equity securities.”); see also 12 
C.F.R. § 220.6 (2015); 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(b) (2015); FINRA, RULE 4210 
(2010), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p122203.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VHY7-G57B]. 
47 12 C.F.R. § 220.10(a) (2015); see also 12 C.F.R. § 220.2 (2015) 
(defining “creditor” as “any broker or dealer (as defined in sections 3(a)(4) 
and 3(a)(5) of the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934]), any member of a 
national securities exchange, or any person associated with a broker or 
dealer (as defined in section 3(a)(18) of the [Securities Exchange Act of 
1934]).”). The Federal Reserve Board regulates borrowing and lending 
securities in large part to prevent customers from circumventing margin 
requirements by recharacterizing a margin loan as a lending of securities 
by the customer to the broker-dealer. Securities Credit Transactions; 
Borrowing by Brokers and Dealers, 63 Fed. Reg. at 2810. 
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equity securities in connection to a specific transaction that 
has already occurred or is in immediate prospect.48 
Therefore, Reg T allows broker-dealers to profit from lending 
customer securities to other financial institutions, as long as 
that financial institution needs the securities to facilitate 
settlement of a transaction. 
Beyond Reg T, Rule 15c3-3 and associated FINRA rules 
provide the greatest protection to customer securities by 
placing strict requirements on the lending of most customer 
securities. In general, SEC Rule 15c3-3 requires that broker-
dealers have physical possession or control of all customer 
fully paid and excess margin securities.49 Securities bought 
 
48 See 12 C.F.R. § 220.103 (2015) (“However, the borrowing must be 
related to an actual delivery of the type specified—a delivery in connection 
with a specific transaction that has already occurred or is in immediate 
prospect. The provision does not authorize a broker to borrow securities (or 
make the related deposit) merely in order that he or some other broker 
may have the securities ‘on hand’ or may anticipate some need that may or 
may not arise in the future.”). Broker-dealers that lend equity securities to 
other financial institutions do not need to be a party to the transaction for 
which the borrowed securities are used. See id. Some situations that do 
not comply with the permitted purpose requirement are borrowing equity 
securities immediately prior to a dividend record date to collect a dividend 
and take advantage of a reduced price under a dividend reinvestment 
plan, and borrowing and lending of equity securities in a chain of 
connected transactions in which only some of the lent securities are used 
for a permitted purpose. See FED. RESERVE BD., Regulation T: Credit by 
Brokers and Dealers, in FEDERAL RESERVE REGULATORY SERVICE: 
SECURITIES CREDIT TRANSACTIONS §§ 5-615.01, 5-615.12, Bk. Compl. Gd. 
(CCH), 2015 WL 6148948 (2016). In addition, borrowing equity securities 
to get more corporate votes would also likely fail the permitted purpose 
requirement. SEC, Transcript of Securities Lending and Short Sale 
Roundtable at 200 (Sept. 29, 2009), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2009/roundtable-transcript-
092909.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK4L-GJ89] (Statement of Leslie Nelson, 
Managing Director, Global Securities Lending, Goldman Sachs) (“And I 
would just add that Reg T is quite clear in the United States that it is not 
a permitted purpose for us to borrow securities in order to permit non-
owners to vote those shares.”). 
49 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b) (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(c) (2015) 
(defining “control of securities”); see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, 
Substance and Semblance in Investor Protection, 40 J. CORP. L. 599, 607–
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“on margin” are securities partially purchased with a loan 
from a broker-dealer.50 SEC rules define excess margin 
securities as securities with a market value greater than 
140% of a customer’s debit balance, or, in other words, the 
amount the customer owes the broker-dealer for the margin 
loan.51 In effect, the SEC allows broker-dealers to easily lend 
customer securities up to 140% of the amount that the 
customer owes to the broker-dealer on their margin loans.52 
The SEC explained that 140% was “fair and reasonable in 
light of the indebtedness of the customer on such 
securities.”53 
There are strict requirements on broker-dealers who lend 
fully paid or excess margin securities from customers. At or 
before lending any fully paid or excess margin securities, the 
broker-dealer and the customer must enter into a written 
 
608 (2015). At the same time, SEC rules do not require that broker-dealers 
have possession or control of customer margin securities, which allows 
these securities to be lent. Id. 
50 Buying securities on margin allows customers to increase their 
leverage and make a higher return (or a greater loss). Reg T places limits 
on the amount of credit that broker-dealers can extend to customers to 
purchase securities. Broker-dealers can lend at most 50% of the initial 
market value of purchased securities. 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2015). 
Different initial margin requirements apply to selling short. 12 C.F.R. § 
220.12(c) (2015). Once a customer purchases securities on margin, the 
value of the equity in their account as a percentage of the loan given by 
the broker-dealer rises and falls with the price of the purchased securities. 
FINRA rules require that customers must maintain equity in their margin 
accounts of at least 25% of the current market value of all purchased 
securities. FINRA, RULE 4210(c) (2010), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p122203.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VHY7-G57B]. 
51 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(a)(5) (2015); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO-98-153, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND INDUSTRY 
APPROACHES TO CAPITAL AND RISK 137 n.21 (1998). 
52 See Dombalagian, supra note 49, at 607. For example, if a customer 
bought $200 on 25% margin, a broker-dealer could lend up to $70 worth of 
securities (140% of the $50 lent to the customer). 
53 Reserves and Related Measures Respecting the Financial 
Responsibility of Brokers and Dealers, 36 Fed. Reg. 22,312, 22,313 
(proposed Nov. 24, 1971) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 240). 
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agreement that states the basis of compensation for the 
lending of the securities, the rights and liabilities of the 
parties as to the borrowed securities, the securities actually 
borrowed, and the fact that SIPA may not protect the lent 
customer securities.54 In addition to these disclosures, the 
broker-dealer must provide the customer with collateral of 
cash or treasury bonds which fully secures the loan of 
securities and must mark-to-market the loaned securities at 
least daily to ensure that the loan remains fully 
collateralized.55 FINRA rules also require that broker-
dealers disclose additional risks and financial impact 
associated with the customer’s loan of securities in a 
document separate from the general account or margin 
agreement signed by the customer.56 In short, customers who 
lend their fully paid and excess margin securities know that 
their broker-dealer has lent their securities, know which 
securities have been lent, know they have lost their voting 
rights, are fully collateralized by cash or treasury bonds, and 
may be compensated for the lending of their securities. 
In contrast to the requirements for lending customer fully 
paid and excess margin securities, the SEC customer 
protection rule does not set forth any requirements for 
lending customer margin securities.57 In addition, FINRA 
 
54 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(b)(3) (2015). 
55 Id. 
56 See, e.g., SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, IMPORTANT RISK 
DISCLOSURES WITH RESPECT TO FULLY PAID OR EXCESS MARGIN SECURITIES 
LENDING TRANSACTIONS (2015), http://www.sifma.org/services/standard-
forms-and-documentation/securities-lending/ (follow “Securities Lending 
Customer Risk Disclosure Document” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/7PRM-
MY9P]. These additional disclosures include, but are not limited to, the 
loss of voting rights, risks to collateral, tax implications, any limits on 
customers’ ability to sell the loaned securities or liquidate the transaction, 
the amount of compensation received by the broker-dealer and the 
customer, and the factors that determine that compensation. See FINRA, 
RULE 4330(b)(2)(B) (2014), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&eleme
nt_id=11316 [https://perma.cc/E23C-SME6]. 
57 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (2015). 
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has only one requirement for lending customer margin 
securities, namely that, “[n]o member shall lend securities 
that are held on margin for a customer and that are eligible 
to be pledged or loaned, unless such member shall first have 
obtained a written authorization from such customer 
permitting the lending of such securities.”58 Based on a 
FINRA interpretation of this rule, broker-dealers can and 
usually do meet this requirement simply by including this 
authorization as part of the larger customer account or 
margin agreement.59 Therefore, broker-dealers do not need to 
 
58 FINRA, RULE 4330(a) (2014), http://finra.complinet.com/ en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=11316 [https://perma.cc/E23C-
SME6]. 
59 See FINRA, RULE 4330.02 (2014), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=11316 [https://perma.cc/E23C-
SME6]; see, e.g., CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., SCHWAB ONE ACCOUNT 
AGREEMENT 46 (2016), http://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-
641707/Account_Agreement_Schwab_One_7.2016_REG18162-16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LTE9-2ABK]  (“Certain securities and other assets now 
or hereafter held in your Margin and Short Account may be pledged, 
repledged, or otherwise used. In such event, we may receive compensation 
for the use of such securities. The value of the Securities and Other 
Property we pledge or repledge may be greater than the amount you owe 
us. Securities that are fully paid for or are deemed ‘excess margin 
securities’ under applicable securities laws may not be pledged, repledged, 
or used unless you have signed a separate written agreement that gives us 
the right to do so.”); E*TRADE Customer Agreement, E*TRADE  § 9(b) (Oct. 
3, 2016), https://us.etrade.com/e/t/estation/contexthelp?id=1209031000 
[https://perma.cc/FM3B-UVBQ] (“I authorize E*TRADE to lend either to 
itself or to others any Collateral to the extent permitted by Applicable 
Laws. I understand that, within the limitations imposed by Applicable 
Laws, all of my Collateral may be pledged and repledged and hypothecated 
and rehypothecated or otherwise used by E*TRADE, with all the 
attendant rights of ownership (including the right to vote the securities), 
for the sum due to E*TRADE, or for a greater sum and for a period of time 
longer than the obligations to which such Collateral was pledged by you, 
and without retaining in its possession and control a like amount of 
similar Collateral and (b) to use or invest cash Collateral at its own risk. 
In the event that E*TRADE pledges, repledges, hypothecates or 
rehypothecates any Collateral, E*TRADE may receive and retain certain 
benefits to which the Customer will not be entitled. . . . In certain 
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notify their customers if and when their margin securities 
are lent, nor do they need to disclose the compensation 
received by the broker-dealer for those securities. 
Since broker-dealers do not need to disclose when they 
lend customer margin securities, broker-dealers do not need 
to track which customer margin securities they have lent. 
Rather, broker-dealers hold and lend these customer 
securities in a “fungible bulk.”60 The fact that broker-dealers 
 
circumstances, I may not be able to exercise voting rights of the securities 
that are lent by me or which have been pledged, repledged, borrowed, 
hypothecated or rehypothecated by E*TRADE. . . .  Any such pledge, 
repledge, hypothecation or rehypothecation of any Collateral can occur 
without my being notified, either separately or together with other 
Securities and/or Other Property of other customers of E*TRADE, for any 
amount due E*TRADE in any Account in which I have an interest . . .”); 
FIDELITY INVESTMENTS, THE FIDELITY ACCOUNT: CUSTOMER AGREEMENT AND 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 11 (2015), https://www.fidelity.com/bin-
public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/brokerage-account-customer-
agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX8S-NWGW] (“Note that property in a 
margin account may be pledged or repledged, hypothecated (loaned) or 
rehypothecated, either separately or in common with any other property, 
for as much as your obligation to us or more, without our having to retain 
a like amount of similar property in our control for delivery. . . . As 
permitted by law, we may use certain securities for, among other things, 
settling short sales and lending securities for short sales and as a result 
may receive compensation in connection therewith.”). For more examples 
of agreements, see MERRILL LYNCH, THE MARGIN LENDING PROGRAM CLIENT 
AGREEMENT 2 (2014), 
https://olui2.fs.ml.com/publish/content/application/pdf/gwmol/marginclient
agreement.pdf  [https://perma.cc/3J4X-7JZ6]; PERSHING ADVISORY 
SOLUTIONS L.L.C., TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF YOUR CASH AND MARGIN 
ACCOUNTS 7 (2016), https://www.pershing.com/_global-
assets/pdf/disclosures/pas-terms-and-conditions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HD2K-5QTF]; SCOTTRADE, INC., BROKERAGE ACCOUNT 
AGREEMENT 9 (2016), 
https://www.scottrade.com/documents/alt/111_BrokAccAgreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8R2S-ZP9Y]; TD AMERITRADE, INC., CLIENT AGREEMENT 7 
(2016), https://www.tdameritrade.com/retail-
en_us/resources/pdf/AMTD182.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AY4-LDYS]. 
60 Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1258; see also Roundtable on Proxy 
Voting Mechanics, SEC (May 23, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5UY5-QYMN] [hereinafter SEC Proxy Voting 
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hold customer securities in “fungible bulk” is consistent with 
the Uniform Commercial Code’s (“UCC”) definition of the 
actual property interest of broker-dealer customers, namely 
a pro rata interest in all like securities held for customers by 
the broker-dealer.61 Therefore, customers do not in fact have 
a property interest in a specific security that they purchased 
through their broker-dealer, and the pooling of all like 
securities by a broker-dealer helps explain why broker-
dealers can lend customer margin securities without 
specifically identifying the customer who is the beneficial 
owner.62 
 
Roundtable] (“The broker-dealer holds all its shares in fungible bulk, so it 
does not match loaned shares with any particular margin customer.”). 
61 See U.C.C. § 8-503(c)–(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1242 (“[UCC] Section 8-503 makes clear 
that the interest of the customers who hold a certain security is not an 
interest in any particular item of property, but rather is a pro rata interest 
in all like securities of the intermediary held in common by all other 
customers who own the same security.”). 
62 Related to lending of securities, broker-dealers can use customer 
margin securities as collateral for broker-dealer borrowing in a process 
known as rehypothecation.  Customers pledge or hypothecate their margin 
securities as collateral for margin loans, and the UCC allows broker-
dealers to repledge this collateral as collateral to third parties. See U.C.C. 
§ 9-207(c)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014); Kenneth C. 
Kettering, Repledge Deconstructed, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 45, 51, 175 (1999) 
(providing full history of UCC and regulatory treatment of repledging 
assets, including margin securities). Rehypothecation allows broker-
dealers to pledge margin securities in order to borrow money to replenish 
their cash supply after extending a margin loan. See Manmohan Singh & 
James Aitken, The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow 
Banking System 3 (IMF Working Paper No. 10/172, July 2010); SEC, 
Transcript of Securities Lending and Short Sale Roundtable, supra note 
48, at 21 (statement of Irv Klubeck, Managing Director, Pershing L.L.C.). 
Unlike outright lending of securities, customers retain title in their 
margin securities and therefore their right to vote as long as the broker-
dealer has not defaulted on the loan to which the customer margin 
securities are pledged as collateral. See Hypothecate, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Although rehypothecation presents agency 
and systemic problems similar to the problems with other uses of idle 
customer assets described in this Note, other articles have examined the 
history and trade-offs associated with rehypothecation, therefore an 
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D. “Idle” Customer Shareholder Rights 
Broker-dealers’ ability to lend customer margin securities 
with less stringent regulatory requirements has important 
implications for corporate voting.63 First, the Depository 
Trust Company (“DTC”) holds the shares of all broker-
dealers as a custodian, whether the broker-dealer or a 
customer beneficially owns the shares.64 The DTC is the 
record owner of all shares and lists the broker-dealer as the 
owner of the shares in the DTC’s ownership records.65 Under 
Delaware corporate law, the entity with record ownership 
(the DTC) rather than the beneficial owner (the customer) is 
entitled to notice of corporate votes.66 Therefore, when an 
issuer holds a shareholder vote, the issuer contacts the DTC 
to get a list of participant custodians (i.e. broker-dealers) 
who hold shares of the issuer, and the issuer provides proxy 
 
extensive discussion of rehypothecation is beyond the scope of this Note. 
See, e.g., Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives and Rehypothecation Failure: 
It’s 3:00 P.M., Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
949 (1997); Kettering, supra note 62; Singh & Aitken, supra note 62; 
Mariya Deryugina, Note, Standardization of Securities Regulation: 
Rehypothecation and Securities Commingling in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 253 (2009) (although 
overstating the protection afforded by SEC rules for customer securities); 
David Andolfatto, Fernando Martin & Shengxing Zhang, Rehypothecation 
and Liquidity (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2015-003B, 
2015), https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2015/2015-003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/72TC-NCAK]. 
63 Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1227. 
64 See id. at 1237–38; U.C.C. art. 8 prefatory note (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
65 Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1237–38; Overview, DTCC, 
http://www.dtcc.com/matching-settlement-and-asset-services/issuer-
services/how-issuers-work-with-dtc [https://perma.cc/6PXX-YWC4] (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2017).  
66 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (2015); Kahan & Rock, supra note 
8, at 1233; see also David Brooks, Depository Trust Company and the 
Omnibus Proxy: Shareholder Voting in the Era of Share Immobilization, 
56 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 209–211 (describing the evolution of the indirect 
holding system). 
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materials to the broker-dealers.67 Therefore, broker-dealers 
ultimately are responsible for distributing proxy statements 
to their customers, receiving their voting instructions, 
tabulating those votes, and sending those votes to the 
issuer’s tabulator.68 
When a security is lent, the owner loses the right to vote 
since the owner no longer has title to the security.69 When a 
broker-dealer lends customer margin securities, the shares 
are transferred out of the broker-dealer’s account at the 
DTC, and the total votes to which the broker-dealer and its 
customers are entitled is decreased.70 However, as described 
earlier, the broker-dealer does not know which customer’s 
securities it has lent.71 Therefore, when the broker-dealer 
receives voting instructions from a corporation, it often sends 
proxy materials to all of its customers who own shares 
according to the books and records of the broker-dealer, even 
if the broker-dealer has lent a portion of customer 
securities.72 Generally, broker-dealers rely on systematic 
under-voting by shareholders to avoid the problem of over-
voting.73 However, broker-dealers risk having more votes 
than they are entitled and therefore risk having all of their 
 
67 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1243–48.  
68 See id.  
69 Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1256; see also SEC Proxy Voting 
Roundtable, supra note 60 (“The standard stock loan agreement transfers 
the right to vote proxies to the borrower. If the broker-dealer has loaned 
shares in that stock, some margin customers’ right to vote their securities 
may have been transferred to the borrower.”). 
70 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1239. 
71 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
72 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1259. 
73 See SEC Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra note 60 (“Some send a 
VIF to all customers holding a securities position in that issue, because 
many customers do not respond. . . . Most broker-dealers take the position 
that the practical reality of any imbalance is relatively small for purposes 
of voting because only a small percentage of their retail customers actually 
vote.”). 
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customers’ votes invalidated.74 In the case of over-voting, the 
broker-dealer is responsible for reducing the number of 
votes, thereby cancelling customer votes without their 
knowledge.75 
There is no industry or legally required standard for 
broker-dealers to reconcile corporate votes. Some broker-
dealers utilize post-mailing reconciliation, where the broker-
dealer reconciles the votes only if it received more voting 
instructions than it is entitled to based on its shares at the 
DTC.76 With post-mailing reconciliation, some broker-dealers 
reduce the number of votes by first reducing the firm’s votes 
based on its proprietary position, while some reduce all 
customer votes or margin customer votes by a certain 
percentage or based on a lottery system.77 Post-mailing 
reconciliation allows over-votes to occur and allows broker-
dealers to cancel customer votes without informing the 
customer.78 Other broker-dealers use a pre-mailing 
reconciliation process where the broker-dealer determines 
which customers can vote before sending out voter 
instructions forms.79 However, since broker-dealers do not 
know which customers’ securities were lent, votes are not 
assigned based on which customer actually retained 
ownership of their stock. Rather, broker-dealers often 
allocate votes to customers with fully-paid securities, and the 
remaining votes are divided amongst margin customers 
either based on a lottery or a pro rata method.80 Finally, 
some broker-dealers use a hybrid method in which margin 
 
74 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1236, 1259; see, e.g., Seidman 
& Assocs. v. G.A. Fin., Inc., 837 A.2d 21, 24, 28 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(invalidating proxy votes of 233,376 shares from The Bank of New York 
due to an over-vote of 824). 
75 See SEC Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra note 60 (“If there is an 
over-vote, the broker-dealer will have to decrease the customers’ vote but 
the customers will never know some or all of their votes did not count.”). 
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customers can contact the broker-dealer and say they want 
to vote their shares, and those customers will be assigned 
votes before other margin customers.81 Broker-dealers that 
use post-mailing reconciliation are more likely to have a 
larger number of retail clients and contend that the system 
maximizes the amount of customers that can vote.82 Broker-
dealers that use pre-mailing reconciliation appropriately 
allocate votes to their customers, provide additional 
transparency about who can actually vote, and ensure that 
votes that are cast are actually counted.83 However, pre-
mailing reconciliation is relatively more expensive and does 
not maximize the number of customers that can vote.84 The 
lack of industry or legally mandated standards for broker-
dealers to reconcile corporate votes gives additional 
discretion and power to broker-dealers over customer 
shareholder votes. 
III. ISSUES WITH BROKER-DEALER USE OF IDLE 
CUSTOMER ASSETS: AGENCY PROBLEMS AND 
SYSTEMIC RISK 
Broker-dealer use of idle customer assets is a critical 
component of the broker-dealer business today and has 
advantages and disadvantages for the customer. While the 
benefits of these arrangements are relatively well 
understood, the potential costs are not. Despite the original 
purpose of the SEC customer protection rule, broker-dealers 
are not forbidden from using customer assets to finance their 
business unrelated to servicing securities customers.85 
Broker-dealer profits derived from using idle customer assets 
create agency problems, and the increase in broker-dealer 
interconnectedness potentially increases systemic risk. 






85 See supra Sections II.A, II.B.  
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programs, like increased returns on customer cash and 
potential effects on market liquidity, and the costs, like 
agency problems and systemic risks. Section III.B will 
explain the benefits and costs of lending customer margin 
securities, specifically the necessity of securities lending for 
key market functions, the increased counterparty risks for 
customers, the lack of direct customer compensation for the 
lending of their securities, potential systemic risks, and the 
loss of customer shareholder voting rights. 
A. Sweep Programs—Benefits and Costs 
Broker-dealer sweep programs increase the return to 
customers and may increase equity market liquidity by 
encouraging additional deposits into broker-dealers. 
However, even after the recent amendments to Rule 15c3-3 
that strengthened the regulation of broker-dealer sweep 
programs,86 questions still remain about agency costs and 
systemic risks associated with these sweeps. These 
amendments did not address the potential conflicts of 
interest of broker-dealers nor the potential systemic risks 
associated with a rapid unwinding of a sweep program. 
1. Sweep Program Benefits—Increased Returns 
and Effects on Market Liquidity 
Sweep programs benefit customers by increasing the 
return on their idle cash. Without sweeps into a bank or 
money market fund, customers would likely have zero return 
on their idle cash. Sweep programs also increase returns for 
broker-dealers, which could be passed on to customers 
through lower commissions and lower interest rates on 
margin loans. In addition, swept cash that would otherwise 
be held in the Special Reserve Account increases the amount 
of funds invested by banks and money market funds, which 
could decrease borrowing costs for bank customers and 
 
86 Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, 78 Fed. Reg. 
51,824, 51,839–42 (Aug. 21, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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issuers of debt held by money market funds. Finally, sweeps 
into a bank may increase the security of customer cash by 
giving broker-dealer customers access to FDIC insurance.87 
Sweep programs could encourage additional deposits into 
broker-dealers, which could increase the amount invested in 
securities and increase equity market liquidity. Sweep 
programs could encourage increased deposits in broker-
dealers by giving additional cash management options for 
customers and giving broker-dealer customers access to 
FDIC insurance. Without sweep programs, customers who 
wanted FDIC insurance and small returns on their cash 
pending equity investment would need to withdraw their idle 
cash from their broker-dealer and deposit it into a bank. The 
additional time, effort, and potential monetary costs required 
to move funds between a bank and broker-dealer could 
discourage moving these funds. Therefore, without sweep 
programs, customers may deposit fewer funds into their 
broker-dealer in the first place, and customers also may be 
less likely to redeposit funds into their broker-dealer after 
they remove them from their bank. By facilitating quick 
transfers into and out of FDIC-insured accounts and money 
market funds with nearly no transaction costs, sweep 
programs give customers more options to quickly change 
investment strategies, which facilitates increased deposits 
with broker-dealers and may in turn increase investment in 
equity markets. However, sweep programs could decrease 
the amount of funds invested in equity markets by slightly 
increasing returns on uninvested cash and decreasing the 
opportunity cost of not investing cash in stock. Therefore, it 
 
87 However, it is unclear whether FDIC insurance provides additional 
protection compared to unswept customer funds, which are held in the 
fully segregated Special Reserve Account that holds only cash or treasury 
bonds. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. Unlike FDIC 
insurance, the protection afforded by the Special Reserve Account is not 
limited to $250,000. See SEC, Investor Bulletin, supra note 22 (“Cash 
swept into deposit accounts through bank sweep programs is covered by 
FDIC insurance up to the $250,000 limit per customer at each FDIC-
Insured bank that participates in the bank sweep program.”). 
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is unclear whether sweep programs increase or decrease 
market liquidity. 
2. Sweep Program Agency Problems 
An agency problem exists between customers and broker-
dealers involving decisions about whether and where to 
sweep customer cash because broker-dealers also profit from 
these decisions. Broker-dealers profit from these decisions 
because they are usually paid fees by banks and money 
market funds to sweep customer cash, and sweeping to 
affiliates can increase the profit of the broker-dealer’s 
holding company. Broker-dealers have the incentive to 
encourage customers to take part in the sweep program even 
if sweeping uninvested cash is not in the best interest of the 
customer. Depending on a customer’s risk aversion, the few 
basis point return for the customer may not adequately 
compensate them for the counterparty risk created by 
sweeping the cash.88 As stated previously, sweep programs 
are often the default option given by a broker-dealer for 
managing uninvested customer cash, suggesting that broker-
dealers encourage all customers to take part in the sweep 
program regardless of a customer’s risk preferences and 
investment strategy and even if the sweep program is not in 
the customer’s best interest.89 The default nature of sweep 
programs is especially worrisome in light of the original 
intent of Rule 15c3-3 to forbid broker-dealers from using 
customer cash to finance their business.90 
Once a customer decides to take part in a sweep program, 
the broker-dealer has the incentive to sweep the customer 
cash into the bank or money market fund that will make the 
 
88 This problem may matter more for sweeps into money market 
funds because customers are protected by FDIC insurance when they 
sweep their funds into a bank. 
89 See supra note 36. 
90 See Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 2690, 2690 (Jan. 18, 1985) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see 
also Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. Reg. 
25,224, 25,224 (Nov. 29, 1972) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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largest return for the broker-dealer and its affiliates. 
Although customers have the authority to decide where to 
sweep their funds from the options available in a sweep 
program, broker-dealers have the power to select which bank 
and money market fund products will be available to 
customers in the sweep program.91 Broker-dealers could 
choose banks and money market funds that pay higher fees 
to broker-dealers but lower returns to customers when 
compared to the industry.92 Moreover, broker-dealers could 
choose to sweep into affiliates in order to maximize the profit 
for its holding company. Potential agency problems are 
exacerbated with sweeps into affiliates because of the large 
difference in return for the broker-dealer compared to the 
customer. The broker-dealer usually pays the customer a few 
basis points, while an affiliate bank and broker-dealer can 
split the multiple percent return expected from bank loans.93 
Most counterparties in sweep programs are affiliates of 
the broker-dealer, suggesting that broker-dealers may be 
selecting these counterparties based in part on trying to 
maximize profits for themselves and their affiliates.94 It is 
 
91 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j)(2)(ii)(A)(2) (2015). 
92 See, e.g., Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 
2000) (affirming dismissal of 10b-5 lawsuit based on allegations that a 
broker-dealer swept customer funds into one of the poorest performing 
money market funds in the industry in return for undisclosed payments to 
the broker-dealer). 
93 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
94 E.g., CHARLES SCHWAB & CO., HOW YOUR ASSETS ARE PROTECTED AT 
SCHWAB (2010), https://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-
4257132/mkt45080int.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S7Y-JAH7] (“If the cash 
feature in effect for your Schwab brokerage account is the Bank Sweep 
Feature, your cash balances are automatically swept to deposits at Schwab 




JXDX], (describing Sweep Money Market Funds for uninvested cash in a 
customer’s brokerage account and linking to Schwab Money Market Funds 
Monthly Performance Summary Report which only lists money market 
funds sponsored by Schwab); Options for Your Uninvested Cash, E*TRADE, 
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unlikely that affiliate money market funds and banks always 
give the highest return to customers. In addition, some 
authors argue that broker-dealers prefer sweeps into affiliate 
banks over money market funds because FDIC-insured 
deposits pay lower interest rates to customers and have 
higher return on investment compared to the rates and 
investment spread of uninsured money market funds, 
allowing broker-dealers and their affiliated banks to increase 
profits.95 In short, the potential agency problem of broker-
dealers maximizing their own profits could cause customers 
to suffer the agency costs of sweeping their excess cash when 
sweeping may not be consistent with their risk preferences 
and sweeping into products that have higher risks or lower 
returns. 
Customers lack the information to combat this agency 
problem because broker-dealers are not required to disclose 
the compensation they receive for sweeping customer funds. 
 
https://us.etrade.com/e/t/prospectestation/pricing?id=1907000000 
[https://perma.cc/88SE-9YRF] (listing the 9 options for sweeping customer 
cash, 5 of which sweep into affiliated entities); TD AMERITRADE, INC., 
SUMMARY OF CASH BALANCE PROGRAMS 1 (2016), 
https://www.tdameritrade.com/retail-en_us/resources/pdf/TDA7002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7ZCC-HS92] (“The Insured Deposit Account serves as the 
primary cash sweep vehicle for earning income on cash balances in TD 
Ameritrade brokerage accounts and is the default cash sweep vehicle 
unless you make an alternate sweep election. Excess cash is swept to TD 
Bank, N.A. (‘TD Bank’) or TD Bank USA, N.A. (‘TD Bank USA’), or both 
(collectively, ‘the Banks’), which are FDIC-insured . . . .”); TD AMERITRADE, 
INC., MONEY MARKET FUND SWEEP REQUEST 1 (2016), 
https://www.tdameritrade.com/retail-en_us/resources/pdf/TDA1836.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DFW2-UHZU] (listing 5 money market funds sponsored 
by TD Ameritrade); MERRILL LYNCH, UNDERSTANDING YOUR CASH SWEEP 
OPTIONS 1 (2014), 
https://www.mymerrill.com/Publish/Content/application/pdf/GWMOL/Cas
hSweepsRetailEdge272564-9-printready.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEL7-
MEBV] (“This cash may be automatically ‘swept’ to bank deposit accounts 
with one or more Merrill Lynch Affiliated Banks: Bank of America, N.A. 
(‘BANA’), Bank of America California, N.A. (‘BA-CA’) or Merrill Lynch 
International Bank Limited (‘MLIB’) . . . .”). 
95 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 38, at 1591–92; Pennacchi, supra 
note 38, at 15–16. 
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Proposed FINRA rules would only require broker-dealers to 
disclose whether they received compensation or other 
benefits for customer balances held at a bank or money 
market fund.96 Customers would likely need to know the 
actual fees received by the broker-dealer broken down by 
product as well as the broker-dealer fees associated with the 
products that the broker-dealer chose not to include in the 
sweep; this would help customers to assess whether their 
broker-dealer was choosing sweep products based on broker-
dealer fees instead of what would maximize the return to 
customers. 
Broker-dealer sweep programs also raise questions about 
whether customers are fully informed about the risks 
associated with the sweeps. The onus is on the customer and 
not the broker-dealer to understand the risks associated with 
the sweep program. An SEC investor bulletin in June of 2014 
advised customers that they should “be aware that most 
broker-dealers place the responsibility on you to monitor 
your cash level so that you do not lose FDIC insurance 
coverage” by exceeding the $250,000 cap on FDIC 
insurance.97 Moreover, an SEC interpretation of Rule 15c3-3 
in March of 2014 stated that although a broker-dealer must 
instruct a money market fund to redeem the customer’s 
investment when ordered to do so by the customer, such 
redemption is “subject to the terms and conditions of the 
money market mutual fund and to applicable law and 
regulation.”98 Therefore, in light of the recent SEC money 
market reforms, the customer must also monitor the terms of 
sweep program money market funds to know if the funds 
have the right to bar or place a fee on redemptions.99 It is 
 
96 See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-22, DISCRETIONARY ACCOUNTS 
AND TRANSACTIONS, supra note 30, at 30–31 (see Proposed Rule 
3260(c)(1)(E)(iv)). 
97 SEC, Investor Bulletin, supra note 22. 
98 SEC FAQ Concerning Amendments, supra note 28. 
99 Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 47,736, 47,736. (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 
239, 270, 274, 279). 
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unclear whether the broker-dealer is required to give the 
current terms of the money market fund to customers when 
cash is swept.100 
3. Sweep Program Systemic Risks 
In addition to agency problems, there are potential 
systemic risks associated with broker-dealer sweeps of 
customer cash due to the increased interconnectedness 
between a broker-dealer and sweep program counterparties. 
If a broker-dealer failed, SIPC would immediately unwind 
the entire sweep program in order to return customer cash. 
Even if a full SIPC liquidation was avoided and a different 
broker-dealer purchased customer accounts, the new broker-
dealer would likely still unwind the sweep program in order 
to sweep customer cash into that broker-dealer’s affiliates 
and other sweep counterparties. The banks and money 
market funds that are part of the sweep program would 
potentially lose tens of billions of dollars overnight. In other 
words, the unwinding of a broker-dealer sweep program 
could act like a run by immediately demanding potentially 
significant amounts of liquidity.101 The risk to sweep 
program counterparties is exacerbated with sweeps to 
affiliates because affiliated institutions would already suffer 
reputational damage caused by the failure of their broker-
dealer. In short, large broker-dealer sweep programs 
 
100 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j)(2)(ii)(A)(1) (2015) (requiring broker-
dealers to notify the customer of the “general terms and conditions of the 
products available through the Sweep Program” prior to receiving 
affirmative consent to sweep). 
101 In addition, because of the risk of liquidity crises, money market 
funds may bar redemptions in advance of a failure of a broker-dealer, 
which would slow the return of customer assets. See Money Market Fund 
Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47,736 (“The SEC also 
is adopting amendments that will give the boards of directors of money 
market funds new tools to stem heavy redemptions by giving them 
discretion to impose a liquidity fee if a fund’s weekly liquidity level falls 
below the required regulatory threshold, and giving them discretion to 
suspend redemptions temporarily, i.e., to ’gate’ funds, under the same 
circumstances.”). 
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increase the likelihood that other financial institutions and 
affiliates could become illiquid and fail following the failure 
of a broker-dealer. 
Beyond situations where a broker-dealer fails, the 
systemic risk of sweep programs would depend on whether 
the amount of funds invested in a sweep program is 
procyclical or countercyclical. If the amount of funds swept is 
procyclical, customers will withdraw their funds from sweep 
programs in times of economic stress, which would decrease 
the liquidity of the sweep program counterparties. Since 
customers have the ultimate authority to decide if and where 
to sweep their funds, the cyclicality of sweep programs would 
depend on the actions of broker-dealer customers. 
With regards to money market funds, cyclicality likely 
depends on whether the money market fund is a prime fund 
that generally invests in either short-term commercial or 
bank debt or a government fund that invests in U.S. 
government debt.102 Prime money market funds experienced 
net outflows during the 2008 financial crisis and during the 
2011 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, while government 
money market funds have historically experienced inflows 
during times of stress.103 Therefore, sweeps into prime 
money market funds would likely be procyclical, while 
sweeps into government money market funds may be 
countercyclical. Sweeps into a bank would likely be 
countercyclical because customers can get FDIC protection 
by sweeping their funds into a bank.104 In addition to 
 
102 See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 78 
Fed. Reg. 36,834, 36,836 (proposed June 19, 2013). 
103 Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. 
Reg. at 47,792; Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 36,843–45; see also DIV. OF RISK, STRATEGY, & FIN. 
INNOVATION, SEC, RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY COMMISSIONERS 
AGUILAR, PAREDES, AND GALLAGHER 6–13 (2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-market-funds-memo-
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FMA-HWMF]. 
104 See SEC, Investor Bulletin, supra note 22 (“Cash swept into 
deposit accounts through bank sweep programs is covered by FDIC 
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choosing to sweep funds into a bank rather than a money 
market fund, customers may choose to increase the amount 
of their funds swept in order to gain FDIC protection instead 
of less-robust SIPC protection. 
Therefore, in times of financial stress, customers may 
choose to decrease the amount swept into prime money 
market funds and instead choose to sweep more funds into 
banks, up to the maximum amount protected by the FDIC. 
This outcome suggests that broker-dealer sweep programs 
may decrease systemic risk for banks by encouraging capital 
inflows into banks during times of stress. In addition, the 
recent SEC money market fund reforms that strengthened 
regulation on money market funds could decrease the 
incentive for customers to remove funds from prime money 
market funds in times of financial stress.105 However, this 
outcome assumes that customers understand the regulatory 
intricacies of broker-dealer sweep programs. Specifically, 
retail customers must understand that they gain FDIC 
protection when they sweep their funds into a bank and that 
the protection would not be jeopardized by a failure of their 
broker-dealer. If customers during times of financial panic 
operate under the belief that the funds presented to them on 
their broker-dealer statements are in fact held by the broker-
dealer, they still may withdraw their funds from the broker-
dealer to place them in their normal bank accounts or, in 
extreme cases, under their mattress. Moreover, retail 
customers themselves may suffer from illiquidity due to the 
financial and economic downturn and may withdraw their 
funds to deposit them into a bank so that they can use a 
debit card or checks to pay everyday expenses. In that 
scenario, sweep programs would be procyclical, with 
customers withdrawing some or all of their funds from their 
broker-dealer, and broker-dealers in turn unwinding their 
 
insurance up to the $250,000 limit per customer at each FDIC-Insured 
bank that participates in the bank sweep program.”). 
105 See generally Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form 
PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,736. (Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 230, 239, 270, 274, 279). 
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sweep program and decreasing the liquidity of sweep 
program counterparties. 
The SEC and prudential regulators currently do not 
monitor the potential systemic risks associated with sweep 
programs because broker-dealers are not required to disclose 
the size of or the counterparties associated with their sweep 
programs.106 Without knowing the size of broker-dealer 
sweep programs, it is unclear whether sweep programs are 
large enough to cause liquidity crises for sweep program 
counterparties. However, the fact that broker-dealers likely 
sweep hundreds of billions of dollars means that liquidity 
drains on sweep program counterparties could be 
significant.107 
B. Lending Customer Margin Securities—Benefits and 
Costs 
Like broker-dealer sweep programs, broker-dealer 
lending of customer margin securities could benefit 
customers through lower borrowing costs, but may increase 
agency problems and systemic risks. As stated previously, 
securities lending is necessary for key market functions like 
short selling and could benefit customers if broker-dealers 
pass some of the profits to customers through lower 
commissions and lower interest rates on margin loans. On 
the other hand, lending margin securities increases 
counterparty risks for customers, and securities lending 
generally increases systemic risk.108 Customers do not know 
if or when their margin securities are lent and therefore are 
likely unable to negotiate for a direct share in the proceeds 
 
106 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
108 See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, ASSET MANAGEMENT AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 1 (2013), 
http://financialresearch.gov/reports/files/ofr_asset_management_and_finan
cial_stability.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DGU-FSXQ]; Joshua S. Wan, Note, 
Systemically Important Asset Managers: Perspectives on Dodd-Frank's 
Systemic Designation Mechanism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 822 (2016); 
Deryugina, supra 62, at 264. 
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from their lent assets and do not know when they no longer 
have their shareholder votes. Broker-dealers have the 
incentive to lend out all customer margin securities in order 
to maximize their profits, while a customer may not want to 
lend out all or any of their margin securities if the customer 
is highly risk averse or if they place a high value on their 
shareholder voting rights.109 Therefore, lending customer 
margin securities could lead to an agency problem in which 
broker-dealers lend too many customer margin securities, 
which causes agency costs of higher counterparty risks, 
higher systemic risks, and a higher likelihood that the 
broker-dealer will cancel customer votes. 
1. Securities Lending Necessary for Key Market 
Functions 
Broker-dealer lending of customer margin securities helps 
facilitate market functions like short selling by increasing 
the supply of lent securities. Regulation SHO requires that 
broker-dealers borrow securities in order to effect a short 
sale for itself or a customer.110 Any increase in regulatory 
requirements on broker-dealer lending of customer margin 
securities could decrease the amount of lending of customer 
securities. A decrease in the lending of customer securities 
would increase the cost of borrowing securities and could 
increase the cost of short selling, which in turn would hurt 
some broker-dealer customers. Therefore, the ability of 
 
109 In a perfectly competitive market in which broker-dealers compete 
for margin customers based on the interest rate on margin loans, broker-
dealers have the incentive to lend out all margin securities in order to offer 
the lowest possible interest rate. Even in a market that is not perfectly 
competitive, broker-dealers have the incentive to lend out all customer 
margin securities in order to maximize their own profit. Customers cannot 
opt out of having their margin securities lent and may never realize any 
costs of lending their securities because they still can immediately sell 
their securities and take part in shareholder votes. Therefore, broker-
dealers generally do not need to worry that they will lose customers if they 
lend all of their margin securities. 
110 17 C.F.R. 242.203(b) (2015). 
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broker-dealers to lend customer margin securities increases 
the liquidity of the securities lending market and decreases 
the cost of short selling. 
Additional regulation of lending customer margin 
securities may not be necessary because customers can opt 
into stricter requirements on broker-dealer lending of their 
securities by not using a margin loan and instead holding 
only fully paid securities. If the customer only held fully paid 
securities, the broker-dealer would need to execute a 
separate written agreement with the customer if it wanted to 
lend any of the customer’s securities.111 However, the current 
paradigm creates an explicit trade-off where customers must 
exchange leverage in order to ensure that their securities are 
always in the possession and control of their broker-dealer.112 
The inability to be leveraged and simultaneously retain 
constant possession of securities and shareholder votes is a 
cost to customers and could decrease overall leverage, the 
amount of securities purchased, and equity market liquidity. 
2. Securities Lending Counterparty Risks And 
Customer Compensation 
Lending customer margin securities introduces new 
counterparty risks for customers since the counterparty that 
borrowed the margin security may fail to return the 
customer margin securities at the end of the loan.113 Prior to 
1998, the Federal Reserve required that broker-dealers hold 
100% collateral against lent securities, with the collateral 
limited to cash and cash equivalents.114 However, broker-
dealers are no longer required to hold 100% collateral 
against these loans, although the Federal Reserve explained, 
 
111 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
112 See supra note 50 (discussing how purchasing securities on margin 
allows increased leverage for the customer). 
113 See ASS'N OF BRITISH INSURERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 4–5 
(describing risks associated with securities lending). 
114 Securities Credit Transactions; Borrowing by Brokers and Dealers, 
63 Fed. Reg. 2806, 2810 (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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“the Board believes requiring 100 percent liquid collateral is 
consistent with prudent securities lending practices.”115 
Today, the SEC net capital rule requires that broker-dealers 
deduct from net capital the market value of a stock loaned in 
excess of the value of any collateral received.116 Therefore, 
customers rely on any collateral received by their broker-
dealer and the broker-dealer’s net capital to reduce the 
counterparty risk associated with the lending of their margin 
securities. However, 100% cash collateral serves as better 
protection than relying on a broker-dealer’s net capital, 
especially in times of financial stress where a broker-dealer’s 
net capital is strained due to financial losses. In extreme 
financial stress, counterparties may not be able to return 
lent margin securities, and broker-dealers’ net capital may 
not be able to cover the losses to customers. Therefore, 
customers still bear some counterparty risk. 
Customers are not compensated directly for lending their 
margin securities, while broker-dealers profit off these loans. 
Customers are likely unable to negotiate a share of the 
profits derived from lending their margin securities because 
they do not know how often their margin securities are 
lent.117 Customer statements and online account portals do 
not state if a broker-dealer has lent any margin securities, 
while customers retain the ability to immediately sell all of 
their margin securities. Moreover, customers usually still 
receive proxy statements as if the broker-dealer had 
possession and control of their margin securities even if the 
broker-dealer has lent those securities.118 Therefore, 
customers may believe that their margin securities are lent 
 
115 Id. 
116 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(B) (2015). 
117 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that broker-dealers do not 
know which customer’s securities they have lent since broker-dealers hold 
and lend customer margin securities in fungible bulk. See supra notes 58–
62 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
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much less frequently than they are and may underestimate 
the costs associated with the lending of their securities.119 
Customers may indirectly profit from the lending of their 
margin securities through lower commissions and lower 
interest rates on margin loans. In a perfectly competitive 
market in which broker-dealers compete for margin loan 
customers largely based on margin loan interest rates, 
broker-dealers should decrease the interest charged on 
margin loans by the amount they can profit from lending 
margin securities. However, broker-dealers likely do not pass 
all of the profits from lending margin securities to customers 
in part because customers probably underestimate the 
amount that their margin securities are lent. Therefore, 
customers bear uncompensated counterparty risk. The facts 
that customers bear such risk and broker-dealers have the 
incentive to lend all customer margin securities mean that 
customers may be exposed to more counterparty risk than 
they prefer. 
Moreover, the fact that broker-dealers retain some profits 
from lending customer securities contravenes the first stated 
goal of Rule 15c3-3.120 The SEC specifically stated that 
revenue that is realized through the lending of customer 
securities should either be used to cover the costs of servicing 
customers or it should be returned to customers by 
depositing the cash in the special reserve account.121 The fact 
that broker-dealers profit off of lending customer margin 
securities undermines both this first stated goal of Rule 
 
119 Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1273 (describing margin-account 
holders as “blissfully unaware whether and how often their shares are lent 
out”). 
120 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining the first SEC 
goal in adopting Rule 15c3-3 as insuring that, “customer funds held by a 
broker-dealer . . . and the cash which is realized through the lending, 
hypothecation and other permissible uses of customers’ securities are 
deployed in safe areas of the broker-dealer’s business related to servicing 
his customers, or to the extent that the funds are not deployed in these 
limited areas, that they be deposited in a reserve bank account.”). 
121 Id. 
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15c3-3 and customer protection by forcing customers to bear 
uncompensated counterparty risk. 
3. Securities Lending Systemic Risks 
Economic literature has explored the systemic risks 
associated with securities lending generally.122 Securities 
lenders receive collateral in exchange for the lent securities 
and are allowed to reinvest this collateral.123 Most securities 
lending transactions are “open,” meaning either party can 
decide to terminate the loan on demand.124 Therefore, 
reinvestment of collateral into longer-term and more illiquid 
assets can cause a liquidity mismatch that may increase 
systemic risk.125 In times of financial stress and market 
deleveraging, securities borrowers will likely return 
borrowed securities and demand their cash collateral back 
from the lender.126 The lender may be unable to liquidate the 
invested collateral for the full amount owed and therefore 
would take losses in order to return the full amount of 
collateral to the borrower.127 Decreases in the value of the 
assets in which the lender reinvested the collateral would 
 
122 See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and 
the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2012); Frank M. Keane, Securities 
Loans Collateralized by Cash: Reinvestment Risk, Run Risk, and Incentive 
Issues, 19 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1 (2013); TOBIAS ADRIAN ET AL., 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, REPO AND 
SECURITIES LENDING, STAFF REPORT NO. 529 (2013), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr5
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T44-NCW5]; TOBIAS ADRIAN & ADAM B. 
ASHCRAFT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, SHADOW BANKING: A REVIEW 
OF THE LITERATURE, STAFF REPORT NO. 580 (2012), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr5
80.pdf. [https://perma.cc/77PT-6FQA]. 
123 ADRIAN ET AL., supra note 122, at 1; Keane, supra note 122, at 2. 
124 ADRIAN ET AL., supra note 122, at 4; Keane, supra note 122, at 2. 
125 ADRIAN ET AL., supra note 122, at 10. However, the cash collateral 
is usually placed in liquid and safer assets like money market funds, 
repos, or deposits. Keane, supra note 122, at 2. 
126 See ADRIAN ET AL., supra note 122, at 10–11. 
127 See id. 
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further exacerbate this problem. Such risks would affect 
broker-dealers when they lend customer margin securities 
and could increase risks of broker-dealer failures. However, 
this risk is not special to margin securities lending and 
would not create additional risks to customers beyond giving 
broker-dealers additional securities to lend and collateral to 
reinvest. 
Securities lending could also make it harder to return 
customer assets if a broker-dealer fails. Securities loans for a 
pre-specified term of a week or one month would slow down 
the return of customer assets in a SIPC liquidation.128 
Moreover, customers may be unable to locate their securities 
after a failure of a broker-dealer if the broker-dealer lent 
their securities and kept poor books and records. For 
example, customers of Lehman Brothers in the United 
Kingdom experienced significant delays in receiving their 
hypothecated securities129 after Lehman Brothers declared 
bankruptcy due to their inability to locate and establish 
claims on their assets.130 The United States has stricter 
requirements on commingling of customer funds when 
hypothecating, which significantly decrease the risk that 
customers will be unable to locate and make a claim on their 
 
128 A SIPC Trustee works to restore securities and cash to customers 
“as soon as possible.” See How a Liquidation Works, SEC. INV. PROTECTION 
CORP., http://www.sipc.org/cases-and-claims/how-a-liquidation-works 
[https://perma.cc/E9H9-EV6N] (last  visited Jan. 31, 2017). SIPC explains 
that the disorganized books and records of the broker-dealer can slow 
down the process by weeks or months. Lent securities would add 
additional complexity when dealing with poor books and records because 
not only would a SIPC Trustee need to first identify where the customer 
securities were lent, but also it would then need to ensure that the 
counterparty returned the securities. See id.; Cases & Claims Deadlines, 
SEC. INV. PROTECTION CORP., http://www.sipc.org/cases-and-
claims/deadlines [https://perma.cc/ZSP9-VAC2] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017). 
129 Hypothecation is similar to outright lending, except a broker-
dealer pledges a customer security as collateral for a loan instead of 
lending the security outright. See supra note 62 for a definition and 
description of hypothecation. 
130 Deryugina, supra note 62, at 273–76. 
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assets.131 However, the ability of broker-dealers to easily 
pledge or lend customer margin securities means that 
broker-dealer customers could face delays in regaining their 
margin securities if the broker-dealer did not maintain 
adequate books and records.132 
4. Loss of Shareholder Votes 
In addition, by lending customer margin securities, 
broker-dealers are taking and trading customer shareholder 
votes without directly compensating customers. Shareholder 
voting rights may have value to customers separate from 
holding the security for investment purposes, especially for 
activist investors who may purchase or borrow securities in 
order to increase their number of votes.133 Reg T bars broker-
dealers from lending customer stocks to activist investors for 
the sole purpose of increasing their number of votes.134 
However, activist investors are customers of broker-dealers 
who would likely not want their votes lent under a Reg T 
permitted purpose.135 As explained previously, broker-
dealers rely on systematic under-voting by shareholders to 
avoid the problem of over-voting, and in the case of over-
voting, broker-dealers are responsible for reducing the 
number of votes by cancelling customer votes.136 
The fact that there is no industry or legally mandated 
standard for broker-dealers to reconcile corporate votes adds 
to the complexity and confusion about which customers are 
 
131 See id. at 282. 
132 Contra id. at 267–68, 282 (failing to recognize that broker-dealers 
can profit from lending and rehypothecating customer margin securities). 
133 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Can Borrowing Shares Vindicate 
Shareholder Primacy?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1234–35 (2009); Henry 
T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816–817 (2006). 
134 See discussion supra note 48. 
135 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. Activist investors 
highly value their shareholder votes since they want to influence a 
corporation’s corporate governance and decision-making. 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 73–75. 
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actually entitled to vote. Under post-mailing reconciliation, 
pre-mailing reconciliation, or a hybrid system, a mismatch 
remains between expectations of customers about their right 
to vote and the reality of whether they can vote or if their 
vote is actually counted. Under a post-mailing reconciliation 
process, customers likely expect their vote will be counted 
once they submit a proxy statement, yet broker-dealers can 
cancel those votes without informing the customer.137 With 
pre-mailing reconciliation, a customer may believe based on 
their account statements that their broker-dealer has 
possession of their margin securities, yet the customer may 
never receive proxy voting instructions.138 The lack of a 
consistent, industry-wide method to reconcile over-voting 
situations raises questions about whether customers 
understand the mechanics behind voting their margin 
securities and how their broker-dealer can take away their 
voting rights. Moreover, questions remain about how far the 
current paradigm has moved away from the basic principle 
of “one shareholder, one vote” because customers who no 
longer have title in their stock are allowed to vote. 
Kahan and Rock suggest ways to address the problems of 
over-voting and determining which individuals are entitled 
to vote. They describe a proposal from the Business 
Roundtable to remove brokers and banks from the process of 
collecting proxy instructions by having brokers and banks 
generate and deliver lists of beneficial owners directly to the 
corporate vote tabulator.139 This proposal would allow the 
tabulator to send proxy materials directly to beneficial 
owners who actually own shares, and broker-dealers would 
 
137 SEC Proxy Voting Roundtable, supra note 60 (“If there is an over-
vote, the broker-dealer will have to decrease the customers’ vote but the 
customers will never know some or all of their votes did not count.”). 
138 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
139 Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1271–72; Bus. Roundtable, 
Request for Rulemaking Concerning Shareholder Communications, 
Petition 4-493 (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-
493.htm [https://perma.cc/W8FJ-3JS9]. 
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no longer be able to cancel customer votes.140 Customers 
would benefit from this arrangement because “brokers would 
have to identify which shares have been lent out. This could 
lead margin-account holders (who at present are blissfully 
unaware whether and how often their shares are lent out) to 
demand a share of the fees generated.”141 
Alternatively, Kahan and Rock suggest implementing a 
direct registration clearing and settlement system in which 
current beneficial owners actually take and hold title in 
securities in their own name, allowing the DTC to know the 
names of the beneficial owners.142 Either of these reforms 
could alleviate the problems identified above by removing 
broker-dealers from the role of counting and canceling 
customer proxy votes and by allowing customers to know 
whether their shares have been lent. However, broker-
dealers would still be allowed to easily lend customer margin 
securities. Moreover, such a complete restructuring of the 
proxy voting system decreases the likelihood that the SEC 
would implement such reforms.143 
 
140 Kahan & Rock, supra note 8, at 1272. 
141 Id. at 1273. 
142 Id. at 1273–77. 
143 Barrett suggests a smaller change of creating an affirmative duty 
on boards of directors to ensure unimpaired effectiveness of shareholders’ 
voting power in any corporate election, which would pressure the 
securities industry to implement technical and procedural improvements. 
Richard W. Barrett, Note, Elephant in the Boardroom?: Counting the Vote 
in Corporate Elections, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 177–79 (2009). Moreover, 
Barrett argues for stricter enforcement of agency duty to ensure that 
broker-dealers follow the voting instructions of their customers. Id. at 180. 
Such stricter enforcement could allow courts to ban broker-dealers from 
canceling customer proxy votes, which would spur reform. Unfortunately, 
such duties still would allow broker-dealers to easily lend customer 
margin securities, and the broad acceptance that broker-dealers can lend 
customer securities and cancel customer proxy votes without informing 
customers decreases the likelihood that a court would find that this 
industry practice violates agency duties. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Additional regulation is likely needed to reduce the 
agency costs and systemic risks associated with broker-
dealer use of idle customer assets. At a basic level, the SEC 
needs the necessary information about sweep programs in 
order to properly analyze potential systemic risks and 
agency costs. Beyond proper reporting requirements, 
additional disclosures to customers about their broker-
dealer’s profits from their idle assets and when their 
securities are lent could allow customers to better 
understand both their broker-dealer’s conflicts of interest 
and when they are actually entitled to a shareholder vote. 
Increased disclosures by broker-dealers would allow a better-
informed negotiation between customers and broker-dealers, 
which could lead to market solutions to agency problems. 
Finally, more invasive regulations like caps on fees and bans 
on canceling customer proxy votes may be necessary to fully 
address the agency problems associated with broker-dealer 
use of idle customer assets. 
Section IV.A will advocate for sweep program reporting 
requirements. Section IV.B will discuss potential reforms to 
reduce agency problems with sweep programs. Section IV.C 
will examine increased disclosure and collateral 
requirements for margin securities lending. Section IV.D will 
analyze different methods to standardize broker-dealer 
reconciliation of customer shareholder votes and ensure that 
customers know when they are entitled to vote. 
A. Addressing Sweep Program Systemic Risks—Sweep 
Program Reporting Requirements 
The SEC should require broker-dealers to report the size 
of their sweep programs broken-down by counterparty. This 
data would allow the SEC to better track the counterparty 
and systemic risks associated with these sweep programs 
and to share this data with other U.S. regulators. The 
current lack of data hinders research into sweep program 
systemic risks because regulators and researchers must 
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know the size of sweeps to each counterparty in order to 
conduct analysis about whether a quick unwinding of these 
sweeps could threaten the viability of each counterparty. 
Moreover, knowing the size of sweeps broken down by 
counterparty would help the SEC and SIPC better 
understand where customer funds are held, which in turn 
could help the return of customer funds more quickly after a 
broker-dealer failure. Broker-dealers likely already have this 
sweep information available and would not need to report 
the sweeps broken down by customer. Therefore, this 
reporting requirement would likely not have a high cost for 
broker-dealers and would be very beneficial for necessary 
research into the systemic risk associated with sweep 
programs. 
B. Reducing Sweep Program Agency Problems—
Disclosure of Compensation and Cap on Broker-
Dealer Fees 
The SEC or FINRA should require that broker-dealers 
disclose to customers the compensation the broker-dealer 
receives for each product in a sweep program. The current 
proposed requirement that broker-dealers only disclose 
whether they received compensation is likely insufficient to 
understand the full conflict of interest of a broker-dealer 
because the customer would not know which products paid 
the broker-dealer the largest fees for sweeping customer 
cash.144 However, the broker-dealer agency costs arise 
through the broker-dealers’ choice of which products to 
include in a sweep program.145 Therefore, to understand 
whether their broker-dealer chose sweep products with 
higher fees and lower returns, customers would also need to 
know the fees and returns on sweep products not included in 
the program. Requiring that broker-dealers present 
customers with the fees and returns on all sweep products in 
the financial market would inundate the customer with 
 
144 See supra notes 31–35, 96 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
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information. It may not be worth the effort for customers to 
parse through this information in hopes of increasing their 
return by only a few basis points. Moreover, retail customers 
may not have the bargaining power to pressure the broker-
dealer to include additional or different sweep products that 
may have a higher return or lower risk. 
Alternatively, the SEC could require that the fees paid to 
broker-dealers for customer sweeps be no greater than the 
interest paid to customers. This requirement would better 
align the incentives of the broker-dealer with the customer, 
thereby reducing agency problems. Broker-dealers would 
have the incentive to maximize returns for customers in 
order to maximize returns for themselves. Moreover, a hard 
cap may better align with the original aim of Rule 15c3-3 to 
forbid broker-dealers from using customer assets to finance 
their business unrelated to servicing customer securities 
because broker-dealers would not be able to retain outsized 
profits off of customer sweeps.146 However, in a perfectly 
competitive market, this rule may not be necessary because 
customers would capture all returns on their assets above 
the costs of the services provided by the broker-dealer.147 In 
addition, broker-dealers may still be incentivized to sweep 
into riskier products in order to increase return since the 
customer holds the ultimate counterparty risk. Nevertheless, 
extremely risk averse customers could still choose to not 
sweep their idle cash; further, capping broker-dealer fees at 
the return for customers would better align the incentives of 
broker-dealers and customers. 
Sweeps into affiliates exacerbate the agency problem and 
could circumvent a cap on broker-dealer returns by allowing 
the broker-dealer holding company to realize a higher return 
than the broker-dealer customers. The SEC could prohibit 
sweeps into affiliates, but this would likely be too blunt of a 
regulatory intervention. Affiliates may offer the highest 
return to customers because the entire return off the 
 
146 See supra Section II.A. 
147 See supra Part I. 
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investment of customer funds is retained within a single 
financial entity rather than split between a sweep 
counterparty and a competing broker-dealer. In addition, a 
ban on sweeps into affiliates would cause broker-dealers to 
become more interconnected with other financial entities, 
spreading the potential systemic risks of sweep programs 
throughout the financial system. Finally, this prohibition 
would limit the investment options of customers themselves. 
Therefore, the SEC should not ban sweeps into affiliates. 
C. Addressing Securities Lending Counterparty and 
Systemic Risks—Disclosure and Collateral 
Requirements 
The SEC could mandate that broker-dealers disclose to 
customers when they lend their margin securities. This 
disclosure requirement would ensure that customers know 
that their securities are lent and that they have lost their 
shareholder voting rights. The current disclosures in margin 
loan agreements likely fail to actually alert customers that 
broker-dealers lend their securities.148 This new disclosure 
requirement would allow a better-informed market solution 
in which customers who place a high value on their 
shareholder rights or have a low risk tolerance for 
counterparty risks could negotiate with their broker-dealer 
to not lend their margin securities. Broker-dealers would 
likely charge these customers a higher interest rate on their 
margin loan, but giving customers the information necessary 
to opt out of having their margin securities lent may better 
empower customers to limit what broker-dealers do with 
their idle securities. This mandate would result in broker-
dealers bearing the higher administrative and compliance 
costs associated with disclosures. Moreover, broker-dealers 
would have to identify which customers’ securities they have 
lent.149 These additional costs could be passed on to 
 
148 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
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customers through higher commissions and interest rates on 
margin loans. 
In order to decrease systemic risk associated with 
reinvestment of collateral from securities loans, the SEC 
could require 100% collateral on loans of customers’ 
securities and limit reinvestment of this collateral into 
relatively safe and liquid assets like treasury bonds. 
Requiring 100% collateral would protect customers more 
than the current rule, which relies in part on broker-dealer 
net capital for customer protection.150 Customers would not 
need to worry that a failing broker-dealer would exhaust its 
net capital before a customer would be paid in full for its lent 
securities. Limits on where collateral could be reinvested 
would also decrease systemic risk that a broker-dealer could 
not return the full collateral during times of deleveraging.151 
Broker-dealers still would be able to profit from fees from 
lending customer margin securities, but the limit on 
reinvesting collateral could decrease broker-dealer profits. 
Finally, the SEC could offer an explicit interpretation of 
Rule 15c3-3 that states that broker-dealers must document 
and prove that the fees from lending customer securities are 
either used to cover the cost of servicing customer securities 
or are returned to the customer. This interpretation and 
subsequent enforcement actions would be entirely consistent 
with the first stated aim of Rule 15c3-3152 and would 
minimize agency problems associated with the lending of 
customer margin securities by stopping outsized broker-
dealer profits. 
 
150 See supra Section III.B.2. 
151 See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
152  Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, 37 Fed. 
Reg. 25,224, 25,224–25 (Nov. 29, 1972) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) 
(“To insure that customers’ funds held by a broker-dealer . . . and the cash 
which is realized through the lending, hypothecation and other 
permissible uses of customers’ securities are deployed in safe areas of the 
broker-dealer’s business related to servicing his customers, or to the extent 
that the funds are not deployed in these limited areas, that they be 
deposited in a reserve bank account.”). 
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D. Standardization for Reconciling Corporate Votes 
With regards to shareholder votes, the SEC could 
mandate corporate vote reconciliation methods for broker-
dealers in order to ensure that customers understand how 
broker-dealers can affect their voting rights. Shareholder 
rights are too important for broker-dealers to be able to 
cancel customer votes without informing customers. 
Legitimacy in any democratic institution depends on voters 
believing that their vote actually counts once they cast their 
ballot. Currently, margin customers should not have faith 
that corporations actually count their votes because they 
cannot be sure that their broker-dealer has not canceled 
their vote. Any regulatory intervention should strive to 
maximize the number of customers who can vote while 
ensuring transparency about when a customer can actually 
vote and have their vote counted. 
Instead of explicitly mandating vote reconciliation 
methods, the SEC could bar broker-dealers from canceling 
customer votes once the customer has submitted their voting 
instructions. This would force broker-dealers and the market 
to determine the most efficient solution to the problems of 
over-voting and canceling customer votes. With this 
mandate, broker-dealers would never want over-voting 
because that would cause the DTC to cancel all of its 
customers’ votes. In effect, this mandate may force broker-
dealers to do a form of pre-mailing reconciliation. Broker-
dealers could allow some over-voting by customers; however, 
they would be forced to cancel the broker-dealer’s proprietary 
votes in order to avoid having all of their votes invalidated. 
This system would allow all customers to know whether or 
not they are allowed to vote and to have confidence that their 
votes will count. This system, however, would increase costs 
on broker-dealers, which in turn could be passed on to 
customers through higher commissions or interest rates on 
margin loans. In addition, because of systematic under-
voting, fewer votes would be transmitted to corporations, 
which could hinder corporations from gaining quorum. 
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Alternatively, the SEC could require broker-dealers to 
inform their customers if they cancel customer votes. This 
system would allow broker-dealers to still choose either post-
mailing reconciliation or pre-mailing reconciliation. The 
costs of post-mailing reconciliation, however, would increase 
due to the required disclosure of a cancelled vote. With this 
mandate, customers would know whether their vote was 
counted and would still have the information necessary to 
negotiate an agreement with their broker-dealer not to lend 
their margin securities. However, if customers are currently 
ignorant about the fact that their shareholder votes may be 
canceled, this system may exacerbate problems with 
systematic under-voting because customers would know that 
their votes may not always count, thereby reducing the 
incentive to take the time to vote in the first place. 
Nevertheless, this mandate is preferable to an outright ban 
on canceling customer votes because this system would not 
force costly pre-mailing reconciliation, would give more 
customers the opportunity to cast their vote, and would still 
ensure that customers fully understand how and when their 
voting rights are affected by the lending of their margin 
securities. 
Finally, the SEC could apply the stricter lending 
requirements on fully paid and excess margin securities to 
margin securities, thereby treating all customer securities 
the same.153 This reform would require a broker-dealer to 
always enter into separate agreements with customers any 
time that it wanted to lend a customer security.154 Getting 
affirmative consent from customers would be costly and the 
number of customer securities available for lending would 
decrease. This reform might significantly increase the costs 
of margin loans by removing a key source of revenue for 
broker-dealers and by hindering broker-dealers’ ability to 
rehypothecate and replenish their cash supply after giving a 
 
153 See supra text accompanying notes 50–62. 
154 Id. 
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margin loan.155 The SEC would need to conduct additional 
research about the cost of this reform, but such research 
could justify why having fewer requirements on securities 
lending up to 140% of a margin loan is “reasonable.”156 
V. CONCLUSION 
Protecting customer assets is a critical component of SEC 
broker-dealer regulation. Segregation, possession, and 
control of customer assets continue to form the basis of 
broker-dealer customer protection, yet sweep programs and 
securities lending allow broker-dealers to profit from no 
longer segregating or possessing idle customer assets. The 
ability of broker-dealers to profit from customer assets goes 
against the original spirit of the customer protection rule 
and is especially troublesome when these uses of customer 
assets take away customer rights and increase the risk that 
the assets may not be quickly returned to the customer. 
Potential systemic risks associated with broker-dealer use of 
idle customer assets adds additional urgency for continued 
SEC review of the customer protection rule. The SEC should 
keep in mind the benefits to customers and key market 
functions associated with sweep programs and securities 
lending. However, the SEC must ensure that customers are 
fully informed about the location of their assets, the conflict 
of interests of their broker-dealers, and if and when their 
rights are affected. Increased disclosure to customers and the 
SEC would allow a better-informed market solution in which 
customers could capture a larger share of the profit derived 
from their idle assets or demand that their idle assets always 
remain with their broker-dealer. Confidence in the financial 
system requires that customers have confidence that their 
broker-dealer will act responsibly with their assets, and 
broker-dealer customers may not feel confident if they fully 
understood the many ways in which broker-dealers profit off 
their assets. Broker-dealers will continue to search for new 
 
155 See supra note 62. 
156 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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sources of revenues, but the SEC must ensure that broker-
dealer revenue streams do not hinder the protection of 
customer assets.  
